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Abstract
Today, companies face the challenge to effectively and efficiently perform their business processes as 
well as to guarantee their continuous operation. To meet the economic requirements, companies often 
consult business process management experts. The robustness and continuity of operations is 
separately considered in other domains such as business continuity management and risk 
management. The shortcoming of this separation is that in most cases a common reasoning and 
information basis is missing. With the risk-aware process modeling and simulation methodology 
named ROPE we fill this gap and combine the strengths of the aforementioned domains. In this paper, 
we present new ROPE simulation capabilities focusing on the determination of resource requirements 
considering the impact of occurring threats on business processes. Furthermore, we introduce an 
example scenario to clarify how a company can benefit from applying these extensions.
Keywords: risk aware business process modeling and simulation, capacity planning, business process 
management.
1 INTRODUCTION
In today’s global economy, where conditions change often and rapidly, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the execution of business processes has become a central issue. As these processes 
depend on the assigned resources a considerable optimization focus lies on the minimization of the 
resources’ costs and simultaneously on the maximization of their returns. The optimization of business 
processes is the key objective of the business process management domain. Especially through 
business process modeling and simulation techniques an exhaustive analysis of a company’s processes 
can be performed leading to an economic business process optimization. 
Another critical factor, which influences the ability to compete, is the continuous operation of a 
company’s business processes. The reasons why the execution of business processes may be 
interrupted are manifold and addressed by several domains, e.g. business continuity management, risk 
management, disaster recovery or incident handling. “It is very difficult to isolate all the disciplines 
related to planning for and recovering from an incident which threatens an organisation either from an 
internal or external source. All the disciplines are closely related and there are areas of cross-over…” 
(ENISA 2008). Although the individual domain’s focuses, approaches and techniques may vary, their 
common overall objective is to reduce the likelihood and to mitigate the effects of events that may 
threaten a company’s survivability.
All abovementioned domains are essential within a company and are a prerequisite to efficiently and 
effectively perform business operations and strengthen the company's resilience against potential 
threats. Nevertheless, those domains are often not applied in an integrated way, but rather treated as 
separate operational fields and addressed in separate projects. Thus, in many cases a common 
information and reasoning basis is missing, leading to a quite different understanding of advancing the 
company's potentials. This is why recommendations resulting from business process management and 
security domains such as business continuity management analysis may considerably differ. 
Exemplarily, the need for and benefits of backup facilities (e.g. a redundant electronic data processing 
center) may be divergently valuated.
There are widely accepted and practiced concepts and standards regarding the business continuity 
management (BSI 2006; BCI 2008; DRI/DRJ 2007; NFPA 2007; NIST 2002b), the risk management 
(Alberts et al. 2001; BSI 2007; NIST 2002a) as well as the business process management domains 
(BOC 2008; Karagiannis et al. 1996; Scheer et al. 1992). Nevertheless, a concept is missing to 
comprehensively combine these domains. We are convinced that this combination allows a risk-aware 
business process analysis enabling the optimization of efficiency, robustness and security of business 
processes at the same time.
Therefore, we have introduced our ROPE (Risk-Oriented Process Evaluation) methodology (Jakoubi
et al. 2007), which enables the consideration of risks in business process modeling and simulation. The 
core concept of this approach is the process-oriented modeling of threats, counter and recovery 
measures. Threats endanger the operability of resources, which are essential for the continuous 
execution of a company’s business processes. Counter measure and recovery measure processes try to 
eliminate a threat and re-establish the functionality of disrupted resources. This process-oriented 
modeling of threats, counter as well as recovery measures and the interconnection to resources enables 
the risk-aware business process modeling and simulation. Within the course of this paper we focus on 
a centralized view on a company’s resources in order to enable the analysis of resource requirements 
across the boundaries of separately applied business process management, business continuity 
management or risk management projects.
This paper is structured as follows: Methods and techniques that influenced the development of our 
method are described in chapter 2 “underlying and related approaches”. In chapter 3 “ROPE – A 
Methodology Enabling Risk-Aware Business Process Modeling and Simulation” we summarize our 
developed methodology in order to support further discussions. In chapter 4 “Deriving Resource 
Requirements Applying ROPE” we present the major contribution of this paper, which is the 
extension of the ROPE simulation capabilities in order to derive resource requirements for business 
processes considering economic and security aspects. This resource requirements simulation 
comprises a resource utilization simulation and an extended path simulation. The resource utilization 
simulation concentrates on the utilization of resources during an incident. The extended path 
simulation highlights the effects of a resource shift on business processes, which is caused by counter 
measure activities. An example scenario outlines the potentials and benefits of applying the
aforementioned modeling and simulation capabilities of ROPE. In chapter 5 “Conclusion” we close
the paper outlining our research results.
2 UNDERLYING AND RELATED APPROACHES
At the beginning of this section we briefly introduce underlying approaches. However, for more 
detailed information we kindly refer the reader to the denoted references. Subsequently, we point out 
and describe several approaches that exist in the research area of process security improvement and 
risk management linked to business processes. 
The British Standard BS25999 (BSI 2006) defines business continuity management as “holistic 
management process that identifies potential threats to an organization and the impacts to business 
operations that those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building 
organizational resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its 
key stakeholders, reputation, brand an value-creating activities.” The Good Practice Guidelines of the 
Business Continuity Institute (BCI 2008) provide an overview and guidance on the business continuity 
management lifecycle as recommended by the British Standards BS25999 and other best practices.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines risk and risk management as 
follows: “Risk is the net negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability, considering both the 
probability and the impact of occurrence. Risk management is the process of identifying risk, 
assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level.” (NIST 2002a)
Within this paper we understand an incident as “situation that might be, or could lead to, a business 
disruption, loss, emergency or crisis” (BSI 2006); an threat as “potential cause of an unwanted 
incident, which may result in harm to individuals, a system or organization, the environment or the 
community” and risk as “combination of the probability of an event and its consequences” (ISO 2007). 
For further definitions of frequently used terms, we kindly refer the reader to abovementioned 
literature.
The aim of the POSeM (Process Oriented Security Model) methodology developed at the University 
of Zürich by Susanne Röhring (Röhrig 2003) is to secure business processes by calculating and 
deriving abstract and system specific measures. POSeM follows a five-step approach, where general 
security objectives of business processes are determined and further refined to a security enhanced 
process model via the description language SEPL (Security Enhanced Process Language). 
Furthermore a list of security measures is derived by derivation rules, which are defined in a second 
rule base and can be configured via the SMDL (Security Measures Description Language). Finally 
system specific measures are generated. 
Both, POSeM and ROPE aim at securing business processes. The main difference between the 
POSeM approach and the ROPE methodology is their totally different intent. While POSeM aims on 
the rule-based suggestion of security measure implementations, ROPE provides a simulation-based 
determination of the impact of threats and counter measures on business process executions. 
Zur Muehlen and Rosemann (Zur Muehlen et al. 2005) identified risk as an inherent property of every 
business process.  To counteract the trend of considering risk mainly from a project management 
perspective they addressed the topic of risk management in the context of business process 
management. Therefore a taxonomy of process related risks is presented and its possible appliances in 
the analysis and documentation of business processes are discussed. A taxonomy for business 
processes is also introduced, including five clusters (goals, structure, information technology, data and 
organization) and two distinguished lifecycles (build-time and run-time), enabling the classification of 
both errors and risk. Furthermore four interrelated model types are presented to capture risk in the 
context of business processes: (1) Risk Structure model, providing insights into the relationship 
between risks. (2) Risk Goal model, depicted by a risk/goal matrix. (3) Risk State model, capturing the 
dynamic aspects of risk and consisting of the object types risk, consequence and connectors (XOR and 
AND). (4) EPCs (Event-driven Process Chain) extended with risks, enabling the assignment of risks to 
individual steps in the process.
Both, the described approach and the ROPE methodology aim at modeling risks in the context of 
business processes.  The main difference is that ROPE connects risks and corresponding threats to 
resources utilized within process activities, while the methodology of zur Muehlen and Rosemann 
directly links risks to process activities. By using a more granular modeling technique we, on the one 
hand aim at providing more detailed simulation input, but on the other hand are aware of the additional 
modeling work, which has to be done to acquire the needed information concerning resources and 
their relation to process activities.
(Neiger et al. 2006) also address the need for a holistic business view on risk management in the 
enterprise systems space.  Furthermore they present a framework by applying value-focused process 
engineering principles to risk management models, which enables risk-oriented process management, 
incorporating a multi-disciplinary view of risk. The presented framework introduces four steps to 
achieve this integration: Firstly business values and objectives are decomposed to identify relevant 
process risks, while each business activity is examined in order to identify further relevant risks. 
Secondly value-focused approaches are used to identify specific risks and to determine the processes 
and corresponding functions which contribute to these risks. In the following process configurations 
are proposed to identify the best process structure that meets the business objectives. The comparison 
of alternative configurations and their corresponding results finally enable the choice of the optimal 
process configuration that meets the identified risk minimization objectives, with regards to overall 
business requirements.
This value focused process engineering approach enables more risk-aware process configuration 
related decisions by introducing a decision model. The ROPE methodology currently does not include 
a specific decision model but focuses on simulation output, concerning threats regarding resources and 
related process risks. 
An interesting approach to detect existing process anomalies and to check process conformance is the 
work of van der Aalst and de Medeiros (Van der Aalst et al. 2005), which advocates the use of process 
mining techniques to analyze audit trails for security violations. By using a specific algorithm security 
efforts at various levels (from low-level intrusion detection to high-level fraud prevention) are 
supported. Even though the presented approach differs methodically from our method, similarities in 
the goal of analyzing processes regarding weaknesses can be found.
Regarding the visualization of our ROPE simulation approach, the work of (Hao et al. 2006) is of high 
interest. They introduce a new visualization technique, called VisImpact, which turns raw operational 
business data into valuable information. By analyzing operational data and abstracting the most critical 
factors influencing business operations, VisImpact is able to reduce data complexity. This impact 
factors are represented by nodes in a symmetric circular graph and therefore provide insight into core 
business operations and relationships. Furthermore the method has already been applied to real-world 
applications, such as fraud analysis.
3 ROPE – A METHODOLOGY ENABLING RISK-AWARE 
BUSINESS PROCESS MODELING AND SIMULATION
In this section, we briefly introduce our ROPE (Risk-Oriented Process Evaluation) methodology to 
establish the basis for further discussions. More detailed information on our previous work, especially 
on the method, our developed proof of concept prototype and application scenarios is provided in 
(Goluch et al. 2008; Jakoubi et al. 2007; Tjoa et al. 2008a; Tjoa et al. 2008b).
Our approach consists of five iterative processes, which are basically derived from (BOC 2008; 
Karagiannis et al. 1996) and extended according (Jakoubi et al. 2007). The Strategic Decision 
Process: Identification and prioritization of the business processes to be analyzed and definition of 
measurable success factors in order to provide an adequate basis for evaluation of the results. The Re-
Engineering Process: This process consists of five iterative sub-processes. An AS-IS model is 
transformed into an improved target model. Furthermore, we apply our modeling concepts within 
these sub-processes in order to enable the risk-aware modeling and simulation of the business 
processes. The Resource Allocation Process: Identification, assignment and coordination of resources 
required for the business process execution. The Workflow Management Process: Execution of the 
business processes within a workflow environment. The Performance Evaluation Process: Evaluation 
of the performance of the executed business processes in order to identify on the one hand, if the 
defined success criteria are met, and on the other hand to continuously improve the processes.
We want to mention that within our concept we do not propose any specific information acquisition 
technique. We recommend consulting industry-specific standards and best practices in order to be 
compliant with commonly applied or required approaches. 
In the following, we describe those core concepts of our methodology which are essential for further 
discussions: ''the CARE (Condition, Action, Resource and Environment) diagram and the TIP (Threat 
Impact Process) diagram. The CARE diagram offers the opportunity to refine business process 
activities. This refinement, which leads to element breakdown, is essential for all further risk-aware 
considerations via ROPE. The second diagram type (TIP diagram) is used to describe the effects of a 
specific threat and how counter and recovery measures operate.” (Jakoubi et al. 2007) A TIP consists 
of the succeeding sub-processes. The Detection sub-process: Modeling of actions which concern the 
detection and analysis of the related threat. Depending on the kind and point in time of the detection, 
the appropriate counter measure sub-process is invoked. The Counter measure sub-process: Modeling 
of actions regarding the counteracting of the threat. The Recovery sub-process: Modeling of actions in 
order to recover the functionality of the CARE element which is affected by the occurred threat.
Figure 1 schematically shows the three modeling layers and the risk-aware business process 
simulation interactions. The interaction between the three layers enables the risk-aware business 
process simulation. In the business process layer the modeling of the company's business processes is 
performed. For our approach, the granularity of a business process activity is not appropriate (Jakoubi 
et al. 2007). Thus, in the CARE layer we refine business process activities into actions which are 
executed by resources within certain environments. Furthermore, relations exist between those 
elements which represent dependencies between each other. For our proof of concept purposes, we 
applied the notation for the modeling of (business) processes by ADONIS (BOC 2008) (BP and TIP 
layer). Regarding the representation of the CARE layer we used a graph representation in order to
adequately visualize the interdependencies of CARE elements.
Each realization of a threat is modeled as a TIP and threatens CARE elements. During the risk-aware 
business process simulation, threat actions decrease the functionality of linked CARE elements until 
the elements are non-operational and / or the threat is eliminated. Counter measure actions try to 
eliminate the threat. If the threat cannot be eliminated, a recovery of an affected CARE element is 
impossible. Otherwise, recovery actions restore the functionality of an affected element. 
Regarding the CARE layer, we are aware of the fact that existing tools and techniques also provide 
resource modeling capabilities. However, the reason why we introduce our own concept is that we 
require the information regarding the dependencies between resources realized through the logical 
“OR” and “AND” operators between the CARE elements.
Figure 1:  The three layers of the ROPE methodology (Jakoubi et al. 2007)
In order to substantiate our developed ROPE modeling and simulation capabilities we have realized a 
proof of concept prototype. Within the prototype, the simulation approach consists of two steps. 
Firstly, the simulation of occurred threats (i.e. the simulation of the affected TIP processes) determines 
the points in time when CARE elements are not operational. Secondly, the simulation of the business 
processes is performed considering delays or downtimes of their activities caused by potential non-
operational states of the activities’ (CARE) elements. Figure 2 shows the scenario, if a business 
process is executed several times. Two times, the business process performs without interruption while 
within the third iteration business process activity B is delayed as a consequence of an occurred threat 
and the resulting suspension for the duration of its downtime. Accordingly, this delay affects the 
succeeding iterations of the business process. The main benefits of the methodology result from the 
risk-aware simulation regarding the determination of economic damage and time loss as well as from 
the illustration of costs that can be caused by security, counter and recovery measures.
Figure 2 Risk-Aware Business Process Simulation (Jakoubi et al. 2007)
Through the process-oriented representation and linking of business process activities, resources, 
threats and security measures, we support the business process, business continuity and risk 
management domains as follows:
• A holistic concept considering the objectives of the abovementioned domains leads to synergy 
effects, e.g. the usage of the same information basis
• The structured representation of processes (TIP) can be used as emergency procedures during 
incidents
• Performing of simulation based analysis enables the determination of impacts on business 
processes and resources caused by threats
• Identification of costs caused by threats and safeguards
• Decision support regarding the selection of counter and recovery measures
4 DERIVING RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS APPLYING ROPE
In this chapter, we introduce our extensions of the ROPE simulation to provide resource requirements 
analysis capabilities. According to (Jakoubi et al. 2007), the ROPE simulation is based on the path 
simulation. Summarizing, the ROPE path simulation considers occurring threats (i.e. the simulation of 
the according TIP processes) and subsequently performs the business processes simulation considering 
delays or downtimes of their activities caused by non-operational states of the activities’ (CARE) 
elements. This ROPE simulation provides information about the economic damage and time loss as 
well as the illustration of costs that can be caused by the execution of counter and recovery measures. 
Furthermore, the simulation shows the impacts caused by an occurred threat on CARE elements and as 
a consequence on business processes. 
The ROPE path simulation provides valuable information about the occurrence rate of all possible 
(simulation) paths. Nevertheless, the path analysis has some shortcomings when it comes to resource 
considerations: (1) it does not highlight how the resource utilization changes during an incident
scenario. (2) It does not determine the impact of resources’ re-allocation on business processes (e.g. 
backlogs).  (3) It is not possible to retrieve the resource requirements needed to minimize the impact of 
a threat. (4) It does not indicate which resources are needed to eliminate potential backlogs caused by 
the disruption of a business process. (5) The current ROPE path simulation only considers resources’ 
availability of business processes, but ignores resource requirements of threat impact processes.
As resources are crucial to perform a company’s activities, we identified the need to not only consider 
resources, which are required to execute business process activities, but also those, which are ad-hoc 
required while counteracting a threat to the continuous operation of business process activities.
Furthermore, we believe that it is also absolutely essential to analyze potential re-allocations of 
resources that support the counteracting of threats in order to enhance preliminary resource planning.
In order to overcome the abovementioned shortcomings we introduce the integration of a resource
requirements simulation into ROPE. The resource requirement analysis of ROPE, which bases on the 
additional resource requirements simulation capabilities, performs the following simulation steps: 
• Simulation of selected threat scenarios (i.e. simulation of the according TIP) focusing on 
resource utilization aspects. The results of this simulation outline the overload of resources 
caused by additional tasks for performing a TIP.
• Simulation of selected threat scenarios (i.e. simulation of the according TIP) focusing on the 
impacts of a resource’s re-allocation from a business process to a TIP. The results of this 
simulation outline the additionally required resources to perform a TIP without disrupting a 
business process through the re-allocation of resources.
We present the succeeding example scenario as basis for further discussions. The key business process 
of the travel agency “ROPE travel” is dealing with customer booking orders. The agency’s internal 
booking system depends on a single server providing essential services for the employees. A second 
ongoing business process of the agency is the first level support, which is performed by the agency’s 
incident manager.
The travel agency plans to analyze the high prioritized booking order business process, especially the 
impacts of a potential non-availability of the single server. Following the ROPE methodology, a 
business analyst initially models the business processes and their required resources (CARE 
diagrams). In a second step, a security analyst performs a risk assessment on the agency’s current 
situation. The identified threats, counter and recovery measures are modeled within according TIP 
diagrams and assigned to the corresponding endangered resources. The initial establishment of all 
required TIP diagrams is quite time-consuming. Thus, we plan to develop a TIP template pool on the 
basis of (BSI 2004), which can be customized to the company’s needs.
Figure 3 schematically shows this example scenario focusing on a virus threat, which endangers the 
server. In the figure, we only depict the relevant actions and resources in order to ensure an adequate 
clarity of the example. Thus, we outline the three typical actions of the business process (BP) 
“booking order”. The action “query information systems” requires the resources “server” and “travel 
agent” to be appropriately performed. The business process “first level support” also consists of three 
actions. The action “handle support request” requires the resources “incident manager” and “ticketing 
system” to be adequately executed. 
The TIP “virus” comprises threat actions that negatively affect the resources, which are assigned to the 
TIP (within the example this is the server). Furthermore, the TIP shows the counter measure actions 
“eliminate virus” and “determine virus source” as well as the recovery action “re-integrate resource”. 
The counter measure actions try to eliminate the virus and the recovery action tries to re-establish the 
functionality of the affected server. Moreover, the TIP counter and recovery actions require the 
resource “incident manager”, which is primarily needed by the action “handle support request” of the 
business process “first level support”.
For more information about our example TIP virus and its graphical representation we kindly refer to 
the ROPE homepage1. This representation bases on the IT-Grundschutz Manual2, more precisely on 
the “Procedures in the event of computer virus infection”. (BSI 2004)
Applying the ROPE path simulation capabilities, the following information is derived: (1) Given that
the threat virus affects the CARE element server before it has been detected, we determine the points 
in time when the server enters a non-operational state. After counter measure actions have been able to 
eliminate the threat, recovery measures try to re-establish the functionality of the server. This enables 
the risk-aware business process simulation of ROPE considering downtimes of CARE elements (see 
also figure 1). (2) The additional costs of performing TIP actions are determined. For a more concise 
description of the ROPE path simulation capabilities and benefits (e.g. cost/benefit decision support 
for alternative risk treatment strategies), we refer the reader to (Jakoubi et al. 2007; Tjoa et al. 2008a).
1 http://rope.securityresearch.at
2 Formerly known as IT-Baseline Protection Manual of the German Federal Office for Information Security
Figure 3: The travel agency scenario
In the following, we introduce our extensions of the ROPE simulation in order to enable resource 
requirement analysis. The extensions comprise two simulation procedures: (1) the resource utilization 
simulation, which analyses the working capacity of a resource (e.g. the resource is working 60 percent 
over its planned capacity); (2) the extended path simulation, which shows the impacts, if a resource is 
re-allocated from business processes to threat impact processes under the assumption that the 
resource’s working capacity must not exceed 100 percent.
4.1 Resource Utilization Simulation
The resource utilization simulation comprises the succeeding steps in case that a TIP has been invoked 
to counteract an occurred threat.
• Determine if all resources required for performing the TIP are operational. 
• As long as a required resource is operational its working capacity is increased for the 
additional workload caused by executing assigned TIP actions. Thus, a resource’s working 
capacity exceeding 100 percent is possible.
To follow up the example scenario of “ROPE travel”, we assume that the travel agency optimized 
their resource allocation. Consequently, all resources operate at full capacity (i.e. 100 percent) within 
their business processes. Through the simulation of the threat scenario virus, it is possible to determine 
the resource requirements during a virus incident. In our example, the incident manager would not 
only be working to full capacity within its business process but is also needed for executing the TIP 
actions “eliminate virus”, “determine virus source” and “re-integrate resource”. As a consequence, his 
working capacity will exceed 100 percent. Information resulting from this simulation serves as 
valuable input for resource / capacity management decisions. As a consequence, the responsible 
decision maker has to decide, if this overloaded resource is acceptable (e.g. if the occurrence rate of 
the threat virus is negligible) or if additional resources have to be allocated for performing the TIP
(e.g. contract with other companies or additional employees).
Figure 4 shows example result of resource utilization simulation. The incident manager is working 
over its full capacity between 10 and 14 o’clock (140 percent). Within this time frame he has been 
additionally required by the TIP for counteracting the virus and recovering the server.
Figure 4: Simulation results presented in a bar chart. The chart indicates that the observed resource 
is overloaded over a period of four hours (10:00 – 14:00)
The main result of the resource utilization analysis is the determination of resources’ workload 
capabilities (in percent), if threats endanger the continuous execution of business processes. Thus, the 
results serve as essential input for identifying bottlenecks and provide decision makers valuable 
information for capacity planning. However, the resource utilization analysis does not consider the 
circumstance that in practice certain tasks cannot be simultaneously performed. It exclusively focuses 
on the resource’s working capacity to guarantee the continuous execution of the threatened business 
processes. The incident manager cannot simultaneously handle a support request and eliminate the 
virus. Nevertheless it is essential to know the required amount (percentage) of additional resources to 
avoid the incident manager’s overloading.
4.2 Extended Path Simulation 
In contrast, the extended path simulation considers the maximum working capacities of a resource and 
shows the impacts, which are caused through the resource’s re-allocation from business processes to 
TIP. Thus, it comprises the following simulation steps:
• Determine if all resources required for performing the TIP are operational.
• Re-allocate the resource to execute counter measure and recovery measure actions of the TIP. 
As a consequence, this resource is not available to execute its tasks of its “origin” business 
process.
• Determine the impacts of the re-allocation, e.g. increased amount in backlogs or waiting times 
of resources that are not able to work to normal capacity.
In our example, the capacity manager wants to identify the impact, if the incident manager would be 
re-allocated for performing TIP actions. The capacity manger is especially interested in the amount in 
backlogs resulting from the sudden unavailability of the incident manager for the first level support 
business process. Furthermore, he is highly interested in the consequences of this business process 
disruption on the working capacities of further human resources of this process (e.g. costs caused by 
the waiting time of succeeding resources). Thus, in comparison to the resource utilization simulation, 
the status of the resource incident manager is set non-operational within the first level support business 
process in order to perform TIP actions to guarantee the operability of the booking order business 
process. As a consequence, backlogs emerge (and increase) at the interrupted business process action. 
Moreover, all resources that are allocated after this action are underemployed, if they are not re-
allocated.
Figure 5: Graphical representation of a backlog incorporating interfaces to ROPE
Figure 5 shows an example backlog curve. Before the virus occurs, the backlogs of the first level 
support business process are within their normal range. After the threat has caused the disruption of 
the single server (and thus the critical “query information systems” action), the backlogs significantly 
increase until the TIP has been able to eliminate the virus and recovered the required server. If there 
would be actions in place to eliminate potential backlogs, the normal amount in backlogs would be 
reached with additional temporal and financial expenses.
The main result of the extended path simulation is the determination of the impacts of a resource re-
allocation on the originally assigned business process. The outcome of the simulation delivers valuable 
information about resulting amounts in backlogs, losses caused by the disruption of the business 
process and by the underemployment of further resources.
Summarizing, we identify the following benefits of applying the extended ROPE simulation 
capabilities:
• Simulation-based determination of resources working capacities (in percent) in case of re-
allocation between processes, for example a resource is required for 100 percent by its 
dependent business process and simultaneously for 40 percent by a threat impact process. 
Thus, its theoretically required working capacity is 140 percent.
• Simulation-based determination of the changing resource utilization during threat scenarios, 
for example the re-allocation of personnel from a business process in order to counteract an 
occurred threat affecting the operability of another (e.g. higher prioritized) business process.
• Simulation-based determination of additional costs, which are caused by this changing 
resource utilization. For instance, personnel have to be re-allocated to guarantee the 
operability of a higher prioritized business process. As a consequence, the execution of the 
lower prioritized business process is disrupted leading to resources not working to full 
capacity.
• Simulation-based determination of resource requirements to minimize the impact of an 
occurred threat considering the shortage of resources resulting from downtimes of resources or 
insufficient resource capacities.
• Simulation-based identification of essential resources, which would cause severe backlogs of 
their dependent processes in case of re-allocations. 
• Simulation-based determination of additional resource requirements to eliminate backlogs 
caused by occurred threats.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented extensions of our ROPE simulation capabilities enabling a 
simulation-based determination of resource requirements considering the impact of occurred threats on 
business processes. These extensions comprise the incorporation of (1) a resource utilization 
simulation, which analysis the working capacity of resources in case of an occurred threat and (2) an 
extended path simulation, which analyses the impacts, if resources are re-allocated from business 
processes to threat impact processes (TIP). Summarizing, we identify the following main benefits of 
extending the ROPE simulation capabilities:
• Simulation-based workload capacity analysis of resources in case of occurred threats 
(overload of resources and impact of a resources’ re-allocation).
• Simulation-based determination of resource requirements and resulting additional costs to 
minimize the impacts of a resource re-allocation (e.g. minimizing backlogs and resources’ idle 
times).
• Simulation-based cost / benefit analysis of resource allocation alternatives enabling the 
selection of the most appropriate allocation to guarantee the continuous operation of business 
processes while simultaneously minimizing negative “side-effects”. 
We are convinced that the strong integration of threat considerations in the business process 
management domain can become a competitive advantage for companies. In our opinion the shared 
knowledge of business continuity, risk and business process management enhances the determination 
of resource requirements, which are needed to perform a company’s business processes. Furthermore, 
this contributes in providing a common information and reasoning basis within the entire company.
With ROPE we propose a methodology, which meets the objective to combine the strength of these
domains.
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